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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The nature of the case from Appellant's standpoint is set forth in Appellant's Opening 
Brief, on file herein. However, Appellant would note that, while it is accurate that the 
Department of Labor ("Department") did not choose to appeal the Idaho Industrial Commission's 
Order in Appellant's favor, both the Department and the Employer (who, up until that point, had 
not participated in the proceedings) unsuccessfully sought reconsideration of the Industrial 
Commission's ruling, which is included in the Clerk's Record, at 202 -225. Moreover, Appellant 
takes issue with Respondent's characterization of his filings as untimely, as will be discussed in 
further detail hereinbelow. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
Likewise, the Course of Proceedings from Appellant's standpoint are set forth in 
Appellant's opening Brief, and, for sake of brevity, will not be repeated at length herein, but a 
summary is imperative, including the proceedings of the underlying Department of Labor and 
Industrial Commission (I.LC.) proceedings: November 25, 2015 (Department's Denial of 
benefits); December 9, 2015 (Appeal to I.LC.); January, 2016-April 4, 2016 (Briefings of 
parties in the course of the I.LC. Appeal); April 29, 2016 (Decision of I.LC., reversing 
Department Decisions); May 19, 2016 (Motions filed for Reconsideration by the Department and 
Employer (represented by Charles Lempesis, who had not previously participated in the 
proceedings); August 25, 2016 (formal Notice of Tort Claim filed to the Secretary of State); 
September 26, 2016 (I.LC. Decision Denying Reconsideration Motions of the Department and 
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Employer); February 6, 2017 (letter from State Risk Management, denying liability, copied to 
IDOL/Werth); March 20, 2017 (Complaint to District Court). The dates of the respective filings 
set forth in Respondent's Brief is accurate and true, and the Register of Action and Clerk's 
Record speak for themselves with regard to said dates and documents. 
C. Concise Statement of the Facts 
The fact pattern from Appellant's standpoint is also set forth in the Opening Brief; 
however, Respondent's recitation of the facts warrants some degree of further discussion. 
Initially, Respondent states that "As of November 25, 2015, when the second hearing 
officer's decision was entered, the period of delay resulting from Defendants' alleged negligence 
ended. Johnson has not pointed to any negligent acts that occurred after that date." Respondent's 
Brief at 4. This is not accurate. Even if, arguably, the issuance of the hearing officer established 
the date on which the delay ended, it does not establish when Appellant knew, or reasonably 
should have known, he had suffered damages due to the delay, nor the extent of the damages, 
which begins the time period for filing under the Idaho Tort Claims Act. Furthermore, even after 
Appellant received the Industrial Commission's decision, Respondent created further delay by 
seeking a reconsideration of the same, on the last date on which to move for a reconsideration 
under the Industrial Commission's Rule, thus resulting in evenfurther delay in obtaining a final 
decision with regard to Appellant's unemployment benefits and, in doing so, presented what 
Appellant believes to be inaccurate assertions. R. 265-276 (Department's Motion for 
Reconsideration. It should also be noted that, in rendering its decision on Reconsideration, the 
Industrial Commission referred to the transcript prepared by Plaintiff, which was not accepted by 
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the Department to avoid a second hearing. R. p. 212, 213, 215-216, 218, 220, 223. As such, it 
would be reasonable to conclude that, not only did the deadline for filing a Notice of Tort Claim 
begin running at the time of the Industrial Commission's first decision, it actually would have 
began running when the Industrial Commission issued its decision denying reconsideration. 
However, since Appellant submitted his Tort Claim prior to the decision on reconsideration, that 
possibility need not be discussed at length. 
Further, in light of the District Court's denial of Appellant's Motion for Additional 
Discovery, Respondent Department, believed to be acting on the advice of the same counsel who 
is representing it in the instant case, and who represented the Department during the course of 
the Industrial Commission appeal, continued to engage in obstreperous behavior by either failing 
to respond adequately to Appellant's public records requests with regard to documents 
concerning the Department's handling of his unemployment claim, or quoting unreasonably 
exorbitant prices for labor and copying. R. 314 - 315. Therefore, Appellant disagrees with the 
assertion that there are not subsequent acts on the part of, or on behalf of, the Department with 
which he takes issue. 
With regard to the remaining facts from Appellant's perspective, Appellant will refer to 
those as set forth in his Opening Brief, and in course of his Argument below. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. The Second Set of Post-Trial Motions Did Terminate or Suspend the Time 
for Filing an Appeal. 
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Respondent first argues that the second set of Post-Judgment Motions, and, likewise, this 
Appeal, were not timely filed. Respondent's Brief at 9-14. This entire argument turns upon 
whether or not the deadline for the filing of Motion that qualifies under Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 59( e) is likewise extended by the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration, which, 
unquestionably, extends the deadline for the filing of an Appeal. 
The nature of a Rule 59( e) Motion is discussed by this Court in the case of First Sec. 
Bankv. Neibaur, 98 Idaho 598,603,570 P.2d 276,281 (1977). In the Neibauer case, this Court 
made several significant holdings: (1) That a Motion, even it it may be brought under Rule 60(b) 
or otherwise, may be treated as being brought under Rule 59( e) if it is brought within the time 
limits; and (2) that one of the purposes of a Motion under 59( e) is "to correct errors both of fact 
and law that had occurred in its proceedings." and "[provide] a mechanism to circumvent 
appeal." Id. 
Given, then, that a Rule 59(e) Motion is a substitute for an appeal, allowing the District 
Court to correct its own errors to avoid the necessity of the time and expense involved in an 
appeal, the other principles applicable to an appeal logically follow. This would mean that, since 
the Motion for Reconsideration extended the deadline for the appeal, it likewise extended the 
deadline for a Rule 59(e) Motion. A Rule 59(e) Motion also tolls the deadline for appeal, id., 
and so, therefore, the instant appeal, filed within forty-two days from the denial of the 59(e) 
Motion is timely. 
In support of its Motion to Dismiss, Respondents cite to the case of Dunlap v. Cassia 
Memorial Hospital, 134 Idaho 233, 999 P.2d 888 (2000). However, there are several important 
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distinctions between Dunlap and the Instant Case: (1) In Dunlap, the second Motion to 
Reconsider was brought following a Motion treated as a Rule 59(e) Motion. Id. at 235. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B) expressly excludes a Rule 59(e) order from 
Reconsideration, procedurally, there is a distinct difference between the two Motions: A Motion 
to Reconsider is intended to allow the Court to reconsider a pre-judgment Order, which would 
include an Order Granting Summary Judgment, and, therefore, must be brought within fourteen 
days of the Judgment following said order. (2) In Dunlap, the second Motion was not denied on 
its merits, it was stricken. Id. at 234. Once the Motion was stricken, any possible tolling effect it 
may have had on further proceedings would, necessarily, disappear. In this case, Appellant's 
second set of post-trial Motions were denied, with timeliness being one of the grounds for the 
denial. Finally, (3) in Dunlap, the Appellants did not raise the District Court's Order striking the 
second Motion for Reconsideration as an issue on appeal. Id. at 236. Thus, the issue of its 
possible timeliness and the correctness of the District Court's grant of the Motion to Strike, were 
not properly before this Court. In this case, Appellant directly raises the denial of the Motions as 
an issue on Appeal. 
Therefore, for these reasons, the District Court erred in its determination that the second 
set of post-judgment motions were untimely, and in its opinion that the time for appeal began to 
run from the denial of the first Motion for Reconsideration. As such, the District Court's 
decision denying the Motions should be REVERSED, the matter remanded, and this Court 
should consider Appellant's argument on the merits of the Order dismissing the case at the 
District Court level. 
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B. The District Court Erred in Granting the Motion to Dismiss. 
Having discussed the issue concerning timeliness, the remaining discussion bears upon 
the merits upon the District Court's grant of the Dismissal, and denial of the post-judgment 
Motions. If the District Court was erroneous in its grant of the Motion to Dismiss, then, it 
follows, that it abused its discretion in the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration and 
remaining post-judgment Motions. As such, much of the following Argument will echo the 
arguments raised in Appellant's Opening Brief. 
1. Accrual of Appellant's Cause of Action for Negligence. 
Initially, the District Court held that Appellant's cause of action accrued on the date of the 
second Appeals Bureau decision (November 25, 2015) and, therefore, began the one-hundred-
eighty (180) day period on that date. Memorandum Decision at 14. (R. at 86). However, said 
decision was not favorable to Appellant. Therefore, while attorneys' fees from the second 
hearing could have been determined at that point, the significant additional financial damages 
resulting from the delay in the payment of benefits could not have been determined at that point, 
as it had not yet been determined that Mr. Johnson was going to be entitled to benefits. Also, 
Appellant could not have anticipated the representations and subsequent conduct of the 
Department during and following the proceedings before the Industrial Commission, which 
further prolonged the matter. As a small example, in Respondent's May 19 (and amended May 
20, 2016), Motion for Reconsideration, the Department, submitted to the I.LC., provably untrue 
statements, with the apparent expectation that they rely upon the same. The I.LC. was not misled 
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and, in its denial of the Motions, expressed apparent disapproval and displeasure. (Record at 
211). 
Moreover, at that point, the incurred damages which Mr. Johnson could determine with 
any degree of certainty were growing borrowed funds for living expenses and attorneys' fees and 
costs. Mr. Johnson, as the, then, non-prevailing party, may likely have only been entitled to 
bring a cause of action solely for attorneys' fees as damages. It was not until he received the 
Industrial Commission's decision on or about April 29, 2016, that Mr. Johnson discovered that he 
suffered additional damages in the form of a delay in payment of benefits. Declaration of Dale 
Johnson, 12 (R. at 57). 
Unlike in the case of an intentional tort, a cause of action for negligence does not accrue 
until the Plaintiff has suffered actual damage as a direct and proximate result of said negligence. 
See, e.g., Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249,254,678 P.2d 41, 46 (1984) ("it is axiomatic that 
in order to recover under a theory of negligence, the plaintiff must prove actual damage."). Until 
the favorable Industrial Commission decision of April 29, 2016, Appellant had no way of 
knowing if, in fact, he would be entitled to damages as a result of the delay in the grant of 
benefits, let alone the extent of said damages. The Idaho Court of Appeals has also held that "a 
claimant 'discovers' his claim against the governmental entity only when he becomes fully 
apprised of the injury or damage and of the governmental entity's role. The question of when the 
claimant should have discovered the governmental entity's role is a question of material fact 
which, if genuinely disputed, is inappropriate for determination on Summary Judgment." 
Carman v. Carman, 114 Idaho 551, 553, 758 P.2d 710, 712 (Ct. App. 1988). Laying aside, for a 
REPLY BRJEF OF APPELLANT 7 
moment, the fact that, even at this point, absent further discovery, the full extent of the 
governmental entity's role is unclear, Mr. Johnson did not and could not have become fully 
apprised of the injury or damage until the issuance of the favorable Industrial Commission 
decision, at the earliest. Therefore, the District Court erred in its determination that Appellant's 
cause of action accrued at the time of the unfavorable Department of Labor decision in 
November of 2015. 
While there are instances in which this Court and the Court of Appeals have held that the 
cause of action accrues at the time of the occurrence, such as Ralphs v. City of Spirit Lake 98 
Idaho 225, 560 P.2d 1315 (1977) and Mallory v. City of Montpelier, 126 Idaho 446, 885 P.2d 
1162 (Ct. App. 1994), these cases may be distinguished on the basis that they involved personal 
injuries in which the nature of the injury was, to a great extent, clear at the time of the incident, 
or shortly thereafter. The Plaintiff in Ralphs was clearly aware that he had been attacked and 
injured at the time of the occurrence, and the Plaintiff in Mallory was clearly aware that she had 
fallen and injured herself at the time of the occurrence, and could have filed immediately. In this 
case, however, Mr. Johnson could not have filed a claim seeking damages for the delay in 
payment of his unemployment benefits either immediately upon discovering the loss of the 
recording, nor upon the issuance of the second unfavorable decision, as he did not know that 
there would ever be any benefits paid until the Industrial Commission made that determination. 
This case is more akin to the situation in Farber v. State, 102 Idaho 398, 630 P.2d 685 
( 1981 ). The ongoing nature of the proceedings are more analogous to an ongoing "project", or 
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continuing tort rather than a single injury that may have become aggravated at a later date. In 
Farber,the Court stated that: 
The purposes of I.C. § 6-905 are to (1) save needless expense and litigation by 
providing an opportunity for amicable resolution of the differences between 
parties, (2) allow authorities to conduct a full investigation into the cause of the 
injury in order to determine the extent of the state's liability, if any, and (3) allow 
the state to prepare defenses. Unless the contract and all of the acts performed 
pursuant to the contract have been completed, it would be difficult for the state to 
determine the nature or extent of its liability or prepare a defense to any claim. 
Furthermore, if parties can present the state with a complete and definite claim for 
damages arising from the continuing tort, then the state may attempt a settlement 
on the basis of clearly ascertainable facts. If we were to adopt a contrary view, 
settlements would either be based on pre-completion, speculative damages, or 
would have to await the completion of the project. A strict or literal interpretation 
of the notice requirements of the ITCA would result in denying the legitimate 
claims of those who have suffered injury at the hands of the state, without 
furthering in the least the legislative purposes behind the statute. 
Farber, 102 Idaho at 401-02, 630 P.2d at 688-89. As in Farber, if the Court were to have 
required Appellant to bring a claim immediately upon the second unfavorable decision, and the 
claim were to settle, said settlement would likewise be "based on pre-completion, speculative 
damages or would have to await completion" of the appeals process, which would frustrate the 
policy behind the Idaho Tort Claims act as laid out by the Idaho Supreme Court in that decision. 
Therefore, this Court should VACATE the decision of the District Court with regard to the 
date on which the period in which to file the Notice of Tort Claim accrued, and REMAND 
accordingly. 
2. Presentment. 
Alternatively, a rational trier of fact could reasonably find that Appellant's prior 
correspondence with the Department of Labor and the State of Idaho satisfies the requirements of 
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the Idaho Tort Claims Act. The District Court held, in its original decision, that it was 
"undisputed" that the prior correspondence was never directed to the Secretary of State, and 
essentially interprets Turner v. City of Lapwai, 157 Idaho 659,339 P.3d 544 (2014) as creating a 
strict requirement that the Notice, whether entitled as such or not, be received by the Secretary in 
order to satisfy the terms of the ITCA. See Memorandum Decision at 12. However, this 
recognizes that, if the Notice is subsequently presented to the Secretary, the Presentment 
requirement is satisfied. CNW, L.L.C. v. New Sweden Irrigation District, 161 Idaho 89,383 P.3d 
1259 (2016). 
This Court's decisions in Turner and CNW leave two important questions unanswered: 
(1) If the Notice is received by an employee other than the Secretary prior to the expiration of 
the 180 day deadline, but said employee does not deliver it until after the expiration of the 
deadline, is the presentment requirement satisfied upon receipt of the employee or the Secretary; 
and (2) do State or Subdivision employees have a duty to present claims that could reasonably 
interpreted as Tort Claims, providing notice of potential litigation, to the Secretary for 
processing? In CNW, the claim was immediately presented to the Secretary, and so the 
Presentment requirement was held to be satisfied. In Turner, the claim was presented to the 
Mayor and a City Councilman, elected officials who arguably have no duty or authority to 
address the claim. This case falls in between CNW and Turner - Mr. Johnson's correspondence 
was presented to State employees who have a duty to direct received correspondence to the 
appropriate person or department, rather than being directed to officials who have no duty or 
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ability to process the same. As such, in light of the policy behind the ITCA as set forth in Farber 
hereinabove, that the answer to both questions should be in the affirmative. 
This Court has allowed documents to stand as satisfying the Notice requirement, even if 
they do not follow a specific form, so long as their contents substantially comply. Smith v. City 
of Preston, 99 Idaho 618, 621-22, 586 P.2d 1062, 1065-66 (1978). In this case, the Johnsons 
received an explicit admission from a State employee that their prior correspondence indicated 
Mr. Johnson's intent to litigate this issue as early as January of 2016. Declaration of Rose 
Johnson, Exhibits A and B (R. at 153-157). At that point, the State was clearly on notice of 
potential litigation, and had the opportunity to begin to prepare for the same. Having received 
and acknowledged this notice, Appellant submits that the State employee then not only had a 
duty to, but possibly may have, passed the information on to the appropriate and necessary 
personnel and channels, including the Secretary of State's Office, to be processed as a Tort 
Claim. To hold otherwise would lead to absurd results and frustrate the purpose of the statute. 
(see Appellant's letter to Gov. and Attorney General and/or Idaho Department office, Dec., 
2015). For example, if State or Subdivision employees were held not to have a duty to send what 
they recognize as possible tort claims to the appropriate authority, the State could essentially 
immunize itself from tort liability by directing its mailroom staff and receptionists to hold all 
notices of tort claims for 181 days, thus creating a de facto personal service requirement. This 
was clearly not the Legislature's intent. As such, the District Court was in error in determining 
that a presentment either had not taken place, or that the lack of presentment directly to the 
Secretary of State, under these particular facts, failed to satisfy the requirements of the I.T.C.A. 
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Finally, given the fact that the State clearly admits that, as early as January of 2016, it had 
notice that litigation was inevitable (as per Johnson's December, 2015and 2017 letter, pp 108 
and 181 in record), its false assurances that Mr. Johnson's complaints would be properly 
addressed, and Mr. Johnson's reliance upon said assurances as set forth in his Declaration, (R. at 
312), Exhibit A p. 59,60 Letter Exhibit B p. 62,63, and Exhibit A, p. 181, 182, 184. the State 
should be held to be ESTOPPED from asserting lack of notice as a defense. 
C. The District Court erred in Denying Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration 
and in denying Appellant's Motion for Additional Discovery. 
In the course of its denial of Respondent's first Motion for Fees and Costs, the District Court 
recognized that this case is "very unusual", and that it was "reasonable" for Appellant to conclude 
his date of accrual of April 29, 2016 (Decision denying IDOL Fees, Record at 246): 
This was a very unusual case--one need only consider the sequence of events ... 
Finally, on appeal of that second decision, the Industrial Commission, on April 
29, 2016, reversed the IDOL's decision and awarded Mr. Johnson benefits. As 
such, the Court finds that it was not unreasonable for Mr. Johnson to believe-
albeit incorrectly-that April 29, 2016, was the date the clock began to run on 
the filing of his Notice of Tort Claim; and because a decision was issued on that 
date, there was a reasonable basis in fact. .. 
This conclusion (based upon the District Court and State's joint opinion), essentially, amounts to an 
admission of a finding that a reasonable trier of fact could have reasonably concluded that Appellant 
should have discovered his cause of action on April 29, 2016. Having come to this conclusion, the 
District Court had the opportunity to reverse its prior grant of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
pursuant to Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration, discussed below. 
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Following the grant of Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, Appellant timely filed for 
reconsideration. "A motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court may 
be made at any time before the entry of final judgment, but not later than fourteen ( 14) days after 
the entry of final judgment." Idaho R. Civ. P. ll(a)(2)(B). "When considering a motion for 
reconsideration under Rule ll(a)(2), the district court should take into account any new facts, 
law, or information presented by the moving party that bear on the correctness of the district 
court's interlocutory order. However, new evidence is not required and the moving party can re-
argue the same issues in addition to new arguments." Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho 801, 
808,291 P.3d 1000, 1007 (2012) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Johnson v. 
Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 472, 147 P.3d 100, 104 (Ct. App. 2006) ("the case law in applying 
Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B) permits a party to present new evidence when a motion is brought under that 
rule, but does not require that the motion be accompanied by new evidence."). Appellant, by 
way of the same Motion, sought additional discovery, in order to address the issues as to whether 
the Johnsons' repeated correspondence to the State either had been, or should have been, directed 
to the Secretary of State for treatment as a Tort Claim. Record, at 312 #7, letter ex A p. 59,60 
letter ex B p. 62,63, and ex A p. 181, 182, 184. 
The District Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration, largely upon the same 
reasoning as in its grant of the Motion to Dismiss. The District Court then summarily denied 
Appellant's Motion for Additional Discovery, without setting forth its reasoning for doing so. 
Memorandum Decision Denying Motion for Reconsideration, Record at 248 - 251. For the 
reasons set forth in the preceding section, given that the District Court was in error in granting 
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Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, the District Court likewise abused its discretion in denying 
Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration. 
With regard to the denial of the Motion for Additional Discovery, Respondent had filed 
its Motion to Dismiss at an early stage of the case, prior to Appellant having an opportunity to 
conduct adequate Discovery. Appellant attempted, throughout the course of the proceedings, to 
continue to investigate in order to gather relevant information that may be in the hands of 
Respondents, including seeking the disclosure of various documents and information that would 
reveal how, in fact, his prior correspondence with the Department should have been handled, 
which bears directly upon Plaintiffs alternative theory that there may have been a "presentment" 
of a tort claim based upon said correspondence. Declaration of Dale Johnson, ,r 1; Declaration of 
Rose Johnson, ,r 10. (R. at 310-11 and 289). 
At Oral Argument on Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration, counsel for Respondents 
(who also represented the Department during Plaintiffs Appeal to the Industrial Commission, 
and who has been advising the Department with regard to Plaintiffs records requests), stated that 
Plaintiffs request for the opportunity for discovery could result in "a hundred" depositions being 
scheduled, Declaration of Dale Johnson, ,r 5 (R. at 310-11 ), Transcript p 49, lines 22-23, despite 
the fact that Appellant never made such an absurd and irrational request. Further, in response to 
a records request by Plaintiff, the Department quoted a fee in the amount of approximately one-
hundred-fifty dollars ($150), which indicates that it would require the production of records in 
excess of one-hundred (100) pages and/or two (2) hours of staff work (but without an itemization 
of the number of excess pages or hours). Idaho Code § 72-104(10). Moreover, the Department's 
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responses have been often non-responsive and/or indicate confusion over Plaintiffs requests. 
Declaration of Dale Johnson, , 1; Declaration of Rose Johnson, Exhibit B. (R. at 310-11 and 
292-305).1 Taken together, this indicates that there may be significant relevant evidence 
available, that may possibly expose the Respondents to further liability, in Respondents' 
possession, that may only be compelled to be disclosed via the Discovery process. 
D. The District Court Erred in Denying Appellant's Subsequent Post-judgment 
Motions. 
Following the denial of Reconsideration, Appellant filed a Motion for Additional 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, based upon its lack of the same in its denial of 
Appellant's Motion for Additional Discovery, as well as a Motion to Set Aside the Judgment 
under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b ), which may also be treated as a Motion to 
Alter/Amend under Rule 59(e). First Sec. Bank v. Neibaur, 98 Idaho 598, 603, 570 P.2d 276, 
281 (1977). On of the purposes of a Motion under 59( e) is "to correct errors both of fact and law 
that had occurred in its proceedings." and "[provide] a mechanism to circumvent appeal." Id. 
In denying Appellant's Motion, one of the bases on which the District Court's decision is 
the issue of timeliness. (R. at 333-34). However, in light of the fact that: (1) a Motion for 
Reconsideration tolls the time for appeal; and (2) a motion under Rule 60(b) may also be 
1 It should be noted that, during the course of the hearing on Appellant's Motions, counsel for Respondent attempted 
to urge the District Court to downplay, or disregard, Mrs. Johnson's declarations, erroneously stating that her 
statements are "irrelevant or they involve speculation or they involve statements where there's no showing of 
personal knowledge on behalf of - by Mrs. Johnson. So I would respectfully request that this Court either not 
consider those parts of the declaration or alternatively give that declaration little, any, weight." (Transcript, at 9-7, 
lines. 2-12). Previously, Mrs. Johnson spoke directly with counsel for Respondent, prior to the filing of the Instant 
Case, and, thus, he should be aware of the degree of her personal knowledge as to the matters to which she is 
testifying in her Declaration. 
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considered pursuant to Rule 59(e) which, in tum, pursuant to Neibaur, is a method to avoid 
appeal at the District Court level, the logical conclusion would be that the Motion for 
Reconsideration tolled the time in which to file a Motion under Rule 59(e) as well. Since 
Appellant's Post-judgment Motions were filed within fourteen (14) days of the District Court's 
decision denying said motions, the post-judgment Motions, as well as the instant appeal, were 
timely filed. Otherwise, the District Court again erred in affirming its prior decisions based upon 
its previous reasoning, for the reasons set forth hereinabove. 
Further, Appellant has set forth sufficient grounds to set aside the judgment, pursuant to 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b )(3) and ( 6) for "unique and compelling circumstances." See, 
e.g. Maynard v. Nguyen, 152 Idaho 724, 726, 275 P.3d 589, 591 (2011). Deprived of the ability 
to conduct further Discovery, Appellants attempted to continue investigate the existence of 
possible additional evidence in this case by submitting public records requests to the Department. 
Declaration of Dale Johnson, 17. (R. at 179). As set forth in the Declarations of Plaintiff and his 
wife, the Department, apparently acting pursuant to the advice of the same counsel as is 
representing it in the instant case, has consistently delayed its responses, claimed a lack of 
understanding, and sought fees for the requested copies, without specifying the number of pages 
in excess of one-hundred or hours in excess of two that would justify these additional charges. 
Id., Exhibit A. 
Coupled with the representations of Respondent's counsel that allowing discovery could 
result in depositions of a large number of witnesses, this indicates that there may be a significant 
body of evidence that may assist Appellant in showing that the prior correspondence, if not 
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actually directed to the Secretary of State's Office, at the very least should have been under 
pertinent rules and procedures. Further, the representation of the Department on Appellant's 
unemployment claim at the Industrial Commission stage, its handling of Appellant's records 
requests, and the instant litigation, by the same counsel places Respondent in a very unique 
position to choose the information to which Appellant has access, whereas the Department 
essentially has unfettered access to any and all documents concerning Appellant that are relevant 
to this case. Without the ability to obtain the possible evidence in the possession of the 
Department, Appellant was, and is, at a very significant disadvantage, to the extent that the 
inability to access said evidence provides sufficient grounds under Rule 60(b )( 6)'s general 
provisions to re-open this case. Therefore, the District Court was likewise in error in denying 
Appellant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment, and this Court should REVERSE and REMAND this 
matter to the District Court accordingly. 
Since: (a) Appellant did not know the extent of his damages and, therefore, discover a 
cause of action for Negligence until April 29, 2016 at the earliest, the date on which the Idaho 
Industrial Commission issued its decision in Appellant's favor; (b) alternatively, Appellant's 
body of previous correspondence to the State of Idaho qualify as "tort claims" for the purposes of 
the Idaho Tort Claims Act and, if discovery were possible, could be determined, at a minimum, 
as being of such of a nature that it should have been forwarded to the Secretary of State for 
consideration as a tort claim; ( c) the State's acknowledgment of Appellant's intent to litigate in 
response to said correspondence should estop the State from asserting lack of notice as a defense; 
and (d) the fact that the District Court wrongfully denied Appellant its opportunity to conduct 
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further discovery in order to support the aforementioned arguments, the District Court was in 
error in granting Respondents' Motion to Dismiss and denying Appellant's post-judgment 
motions. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the District Court's judgment herein should be 
REVERSED and the matter REMANDED for further proceedings and a jury trial, as demanded 
in the Original Complaint. 
DA TED this 22d day of April, 2019. 
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JAMES McMILLAN, 
/s/ James McMillan 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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and correct copy of the foregoing to the following by the method indicated below: 
Doug Werth 
Deputy Attorney General 
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Boise, Idaho 83735 
Attorney for Respondents 
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